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In the past few decades, scholars from several disciplines have
pursued the curious parallel noted by Darwin between the genetic
evolution of species and the cultural evolution of beliefs, skills,
knowledge, languages, institutions, and other forms of socially
transmitted information. Here, I review current progress in the
pursuit of an evolutionary science of culture that is grounded in
both biological and evolutionary theory, but also treats culture as
more than a proximate mechanism that is directly controlled by
genes. Both genetic and cultural evolution can be described as
systems of inherited variation that change over time in response
to processes such as selection, migration, and drift. Appropriate
differences between genetic and cultural change are taken seriously,
such as the possibility in the latter of nonrandomly guided variation
or transformation, blending inheritance, and one-to-many trans-
mission. The foundation of cultural evolution was laid in the late
20th century with population-genetic style models of cultural mi-
croevolution, and the use of phylogenetic methods to reconstruct
cultural macroevolution. Since then, there have been major efforts
to understand the sociocognitive mechanisms underlying cumulative
cultural evolution, the consequences of demography on cultural
evolution, the empirical validity of assumed social learning biases,
the relative role of transformative and selective processes, and the
use of quantitative phylogenetic and multilevel selection models to
understand past and present dynamics of society-level change.
I conclude by highlighting the interdisciplinary challenges of study-
ing cultural evolution, including its relation to the traditional social
sciences and humanities.
cultural evolution | cumulative culture | gene–culture coevolution |
human evolution | social learning
The formation of different languages and of distinct species, and the
proofs that both have been developed through a gradual process, are
curiously parallel. . .
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, p 90
This quote from Charles Darwin (1) draws a parallel between,on the one hand, the genetic evolution of species, and on the
other, cultural change (i.e., changes in socially learned infor-
mation, such as beliefs, knowledge, tools, technology, attitudes,
norms, and, as Darwin mentions, languages). This idea is the
basic premise of cultural evolution: Cultural change constitutes a
Darwinian evolutionary process that shares key characteristics
with the genetic evolution of species. The emergence of this second
evolutionary process saw an unprecedented extension of genetic
evolution by allowing organisms to adapt more rapidly to, and
more powerfully create and shape, their environments.
Since the 1980s, this parallel between genetic and cultural
evolution has been pursued by scholars from a range of disci-
plines across the social, behavioral, and biological sciences. In
this article, I review the current state of this interdisciplinary
effort, focusing on topics of major recent research interest. No
new theories or findings are presented, but in presenting dispa-
rate strands of work alongside each other, I hope to identify links
between strands and foster a synthetic evolutionary science of
culture (2, 3) paralleling the interdisciplinary synthesis of the
biological sciences in the early 20th century.
Historical Context
Darwin’s comment above was inspired by historical linguists of
his time, who, even before publication of On the Origin of Species
(4), were constructing tree-like schemas of extant languages ex-
plicitly based on the assumption of common descent (5). Although
“evolutionary” ideas became popular ways of describing cultural
change in the late 1800s, such ideas were confused. Many scholars
erroneously saw evolution as inevitable progress along fixed stages
of increasing complexity (e.g., from savagery to barbarism to civi-
lization), drawing more from Herbert Spencer than from Darwin
(6). There was also much confusion, in the absence of a clear
understanding of genetics, about genetic and cultural inheritance.
Theories were often literally Lamarckian, with ideas, artifacts, and
words somehow thought to become part of the germ line through
repeated use (7). Due to this confusion, as well as the misuse of
pseudoevolutionary racial theories for distasteful political ends,
early 20th century social scientists declared culture to be separate
from “the organic” (8); the biological and social sciences went
separate ways; and the notion of cultural evolution, or indeed any
evolutionary basis for human behavior, fell from favor.
Cultural Microevolution
It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that a properly Darwinian
theory of cultural change was formulated, first by Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman (9, 10) and then by Boyd and Richerson (11). This
theory comprised quantitative models of cultural microevolution,
describing the mechanisms by which cultural variation is trans-
mitted from person to person, and the processes that change this
variation over time within populations (Table 1), thus embodying
the “population thinking” that characterizes Darwin’s approach.
Here, “culture” is defined as “information capable of affecting
individuals’ behavior that they acquire from other members of their
species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social trans-
mission” (12). “Social transmission,” “social learning,” and
“cultural transmission” are used interchangeably to denote the
nongenetic transfer of learned information from one individual
to another. “Cultural trait,” “cultural variant,” and sometimes
“meme” are used to refer to the information (e.g., ideas, attitudes,
skills) that is transmitted. All of these terms hide huge complexity
and caveats. Such simplification is typical of a modeling approach.
This approach follows population genetics, which makes simplify-
ing assumptions (e.g., infinitely large populations) to understand
similarly complex genetic evolutionary processes. The simplification
in both cases is tactical, aiming to understand complex processes in
a piecemeal fashion and to formalize verbal arguments (13).
Some of the processes in Table 1 have parallels in genetic
evolution. Selection-like “content” or “direct” biases favor the
acquisition and transmission of some cultural variants over others
due to their memorability or effectiveness (14, 15), just as some
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alleles have higher fitness than others. Random cultural “mutation”
occurs where new variation arises randomly, such as via perceptual
error (16), akin to random genetic mutation. Migration allows indi-
viduals to introduce novel variants to a population as they move (17),
just as gene flow spreads alleles. Some cultural traits, such as first
names, fit the expectations of neutral drift (18), just like some alleles.
However, this enterprise is not simply the unthinking transfer
of models from genetic to cultural evolution. In many cases,
cultural variation is generated, inherited, and changed in very dif-
ferent ways from genetic variation, and models have addressed these
differences (10, 11). Examples include the blending of continuous,
nonparticulate cultural variation; the systematic, nonrandom
generation of cultural variation, or “guided variation”; frequency-
dependent biases, such as conformity, where variants are adopted
based on their commonness in the population; and indirect biases,
where traits are adopted based on the characteristics of their
bearers, such as success or prestige. Where possible, evidence
from psychology, anthropology, sociology, and other fields was
used to justify these processes (10, 11). However, the use of
quantitative models went beyond typical theory in the social and
behavioral sciences by (i) precisely and explicitly defining these
processes rather than relying on imprecise verbal descriptions of
phenomena (e.g., “conformity”) and (ii) exploring the population-
level consequences of such processes, such as the consequences
of frequency-dependent biases for between- and within-group
cultural variation (19).
Cultural Macroevolution
In the 1990s, the study of cultural microevolution was supple-
mented by the study of cultural macroevolution, defined as long-
term cultural change at or above the level of the society. Mace
and Pagel (20) introduced the phylogenetic comparative method
as a means to (i) reconstruct the cultural evolutionary history of
a particular trait or set of traits and (ii) test functional hypoth-
eses concerning the spread or distribution of cultural variation
across societies while controlling for evolutionary history. The
latter had been a problem within anthropology for over a cen-
tury. In 1889, Francis Galton (21) pointed out that even if two
traits (e.g., cattle-keeping and patriliny) often co-occur across
many societies, this co-occurrence does not necessarily provide
evidence that they are functionally associated (e.g., cattle-keeping
causes patriliny), because all these societies may have culturally
inherited this combination from a common ancestral society. So-
cieties are not necessarily statistically independent data points, due
to shared history. This problem is the same one facing biologists
when comparing across species, and, in the meantime, biologists
had developed methods for controlling for nonindependence due
to common descent (22). Mace, Pagel, and others imported these
methods to test functional evolutionary hypotheses in the same
way, showing, for example, that cattle-keeping did likely cause a
switch from matriliny to patriliny even after controlling for
descent (23).
Concurrently, archaeologists began using phylogenetic meth-
ods to reconstruct the history of artifacts, such as projectile
points (24), and, following Darwin’s original insight, others be-
gan reconstructing the history of language families (25). Like for
microevolution, the advantage here was in the use of quantitative
methods borrowed from biology that were explicit in their as-
sumptions about how to reconstruct historical relationships (e.g.,
maximum parsimony, maximum likelihood), repeatable and ex-
tendable by others, and easily scaled up to large datasets (26), in
contrast to the informal, idiosyncratic, and subjective schemas of
historical linguistics or archaeology.
Is It Evolution?
A common question is whether culture really evolves. This
question comes from both social scientists skeptical of any kind
of parallel with evolution, and biologists insistent that Darwin’s
theory applies only to genetic evolution (27). Importantly, no
one argues that genetic evolution and cultural evolution operate
identically. From the outset, microevolutionary modelers in-
corporated processes unique to cultural change, such as one-to-
many transmission (10) or nonrandomly guided variation (11).
However, an examination of Table 1 indicates that the parallels
are numerous enough to warrant an evolutionary theory of culture,
as long as these differences are taken seriously. At its heart, cultural
change is a process of inherited variation that changes due to se-
lection, drift, migration, and other processes, which, in their details,
may operate similar to or different from the genetic case.
Similarly, at the macroevolutionary level, it is sometimes ar-
gued that human culture is so riven with cross-lineage diffusion
that it is not tree-like, and thus not amenable to phylogenetic
methods (26). Although this argument may be true for some
cultural domains, many, such as languages or some artifacts,
have been shown to be tree-like due to strong intergenerational
cultural descent (28). Moreover, cross-lineage blending is a
common feature of genetic evolution when we look beyond our
own kingdom to, say, prokaryotes, where horizontal gene trans-
fer is rife (29). Indeed, network-based methods exist for dealing
with non–tree-like data (30).
One indirect, but perhaps most important, test of the parallel
between genetic and cultural change is whether methods bor-
rowed from evolutionary biology, suitably modified, actually
prove useful in explaining cultural change in a manner that adds
to the findings of nonevolutionary methods. Table 2 lists such
methods, which are further discussed throughout this article.
Evolution of Cultural Evolution
In parallel to the study of cultural change itself, that is, changes
in the contents of culture, modelers have also examined when
and why the capacity for cultural evolution evolved. Models
Table 1. Comparison of genetic and cultural evolution as originally modeled by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (10)
and Boyd and Richerson (11), with citations to recent empirical tests or examples
Process Genetic evolution Cultural evolution
Variation Genetic mutation Undirected cultural mutation/invention (16)
Recombination Recombination (133)
— Guided variation or transformation (109, 112)
Inheritance Particulate Particulate or “meme-like” (134)
— Blending of continuous cultural variation (60)
Vertical (parent to offspring) Vertical cultural transmission (75)
Horizontal gene transfer Horizontal/oblique cultural transmission (76, 77)
Selection Natural selection Cultural selection or direct/content biases (14, 15)
— Frequency-dependent biases (e.g., conformity) (88, 89)
— Indirect (e.g., success, prestige) biases (92, 99)
Migration Gene flow Demic diffusion (movement of people with their cultural traits) (17)
— Cultural diffusion (movement of traits without people) (135)
Drift Genetic drift Cultural drift (18)
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suggest social learning evolves when environments change at
intermediate rates: too quickly for genes to track directly, but not
so fast that socially learned information is outdated (11, 31). An
influential model by Rogers (32) showed that whereas social
learning readily evolves in such conditions, it does not increase
mean population fitness, contrary to claims that culture is responsible
for our species’ evolutionary success. Further models showed that
social learning does enhance population fitness when it is cumulative;
that is, individuals can learn via social learning what they could not
possibly learn alone (33). This finding has led to extensive study of the
factors that permit cumulative culture (discussed below). Finally,
gene–culture coevolution models and data have examined how
cultural evolution interacts with and affects genetic evolution (34).
There is extensive evidence for culture-driven genetic change in
humans, including agriculture-induced genetic adaptations for
digesting starch, dairy products, and alcohol (34, 35). Overall, this
research shows the extent to which culture extends genetic evolu-
tion by independently tracking environmental change that is too
rapid for genes to track, by generating diverse cultural adaptations
to those environmental challenges, and by driving genetic
evolution.
Recent Research Trends
Cumulative Culture. Just 20 y ago, little was known about social
learning and culture in nonhuman species. Many definitions of
culture stated that it was unique to humans, making the notion of
“nonhuman culture” nonsensical. Now, it is established that a
range of species from diverse taxa exhibit social learning (36), as
well as cultural traditions, where social learning generates long-
lasting behavioral differences between groups (37).
However, there is still a gulf between the cultural achieve-
ments of humans and other species. Recent work has focused on
cumulative culture, where knowledge is built up over successive
generations to exceed anything that a single individual could
invent alone (38, 39). This ability appears to be unique to hu-
mans: Although chimpanzees’ nut-cracking (36) or dolphins’ use
of protective nose-sponges (40) does not seem to exceed what a
lone chimpanzee or dolphin could invent alone, it is surely im-
possible for a single human to have discovered quantum me-
chanics, invented smartphones, visited the moon, or achieved
any of the other feats that require standing on the shoulders of
previous generations. As noted above, models of the evolution of
culture show that cumulative culture is particularly effective at in-
creasing mean population fitness beyond the population fitness of
noncumulative cultural species (33). A major research question is
therefore “What allows human culture to be uniquely cumulative?”
There has been much focus on high-fidelity social learning,
which is needed to preserve modifications over successive gen-
erations such that they can accumulate (41, 42). It was initially
suggested that imitation (i.e., the copying of bodily actions rather
than products) was key to this high fidelity (43). This claim seems
doubtful, given that chimpanzees can imitate tool use techniques
with high enough fidelity for alternate techniques to stabilize in
different groups (44). Rather than an “imitation vs. no-imitation”
dichotomy, perhaps humans are more effective, spontaneous, or
compulsive imitators (45). Other comparative work has sug-
gested roles for prosociality and language-mediated teaching
(46). As well as individual cognitive abilities, cumulative culture
may also require favorable demography, such as larger pop-
ulations (42, 47) or populations partially connected via migration
(48, 49), as is typical of human societies (50). Currently, there is
no consensus on which of these factors is key to explaining
uniquely human cumulative culture. A combination of more than
one factor is probably necessary, perhaps explaining why cumu-
lative culture is confined to just one extant species.
Is “cumulative culture” synonymous with “cultural evolution”?
In principle, evolutionary change can be noncumulative, in-
volving changes in trait frequencies over time such as occurs with
genetic drift or local adaptive changes in gene frequencies. In
this sense, nonhuman, noncumulative cultural change can justi-
fiably be called cultural evolution. However, genetic evolution is
clearly also cumulative, involving the gradual accumulation of
beneficial genetic modifications over time to produce complex ad-
aptations, such as eyes or wings. Human cumulative cultural evo-
lution bears a clear parallel with this form of cumulative genetic
evolution. Indeed, the gradual accumulation of cultural innovations
results in complex cultural adaptations, such as telescopes or air-
planes, that resemble and rival complex genetic adaptations (12).
Ideas regarding the origin of cumulative culture can inform
thinking about factors that might affect recent and ongoing cu-
mulative cultural evolution. The invention of writing, followed by
digital media, surely greatly increased the fidelity of social
learning and, potentially, the speed of cumulative culture (51).
Demographically, the threefold increase in the world population
and increased global mobility in the past century should also
have accelerated cumulative culture. However, there are also
constraints. For example, as the amount of knowledge that is
accumulated increases (which, by definition, it must), it should
take longer for each new individual to acquire that knowledge.
This increased acquisition cost may result in extended educational
periods, and the eventual slowing down of cumulative culture as
innovation becomes harder (52).
Demography. Biologists have long recognized that demographic
factors, such as population size, structure, and interconnectedness,
are crucial for understanding trajectories of evolutionary change
(53). Although the effect of demography on cultural evolution was
modeled in the 1980s (10), the past decade has seen a major focus,
mostly in archaeology, on the way in which population structure
affects patterns of cultural variation and the gain and loss of
cultural complexity. Shennan (54) and Henrich (47) argued that
population size has been a major determinant of cultural com-
plexity in hunter-gatherers, often measured as the number of tools
in a toolkit or the number of components per tool. Henrich (47)
argued that the loss of toolkit complexity in Tasmania following
isolation from Australia 12 kya was due to reduced effective
population size, because the isolated population was too small to
maintain complexity, given imperfect social learning. In his model
of this process, each member of each new generation acquires the
skill of the most skillful member of the previous generation with
systematic loss due to copying error and some chance of im-
provement. Larger populations make the loss of skills due to im-
perfect copying less likely and improvements more likely. Shennan
and coworkers (48, 54) argued that increasing population densities
in Upper Paleolithic Europe around 45 kya caused the major increase
Table 2. Methods and concepts that have been adapted from evolutionary biology to study cultural change
Evolutionary biology Cultural evolution
Population genetic models Cultural evolution (or gene–culture coevolution) models (10, 11)
Gene-based phylogenetics Cultural phylogenetics (24, 26)
Comparative (cross-species) method Comparative (cross-cultural) method (20)
Population dynamic models Historical dynamic models (120)
Multilevel selection Multilevel cultural selection (122, 123)
Genetic drift Cultural drift (15, 18)
Multigeneration breeding experiments Multigeneration transmission chain experiments (111, 136)
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in symbolic and technological complexity seen in the archaeological
record, rather than a genetic mutation that enhanced cognitive ability.
Subsequent tests of the link between demography and cultural
complexity have been mixed. Analyses of tools (55) and lan-
guages (56) on islands in the Pacific Ocean are supportive, with
toolkit complexity and word gain rate increasing with island size.
Others have found environmental risk, not population size, to
predict toolkit complexity (57). These findings remain to be
reconciled. A recent critique arguing that “population size does
not explain past changes in cultural complexity” (58) is surely too
strong (59). Although not even the strongest advocates of de-
mography would argue that population size should always pre-
dict cultural complexity, the notion that demography has no
effect at all is surely also incorrect in light of the positive evi-
dence cited above. Recent models integrating population density
and mobility (not simply population size) as proxies of cul-
tural transmission (49) offer promise for more robust tests of
demographic hypotheses.
Experiments have also examined how population size affects
cultural complexity (60–63). Experiments cannot prove whether
demography affects cultural evolution in the real world, but they
can test the validity of behavioral assumptions of demographic
models and manipulate factors in a way we cannot in real life.
For example, the one study not to find a link between group size
and cultural complexity used a simple task that is unlikely to
benefit from a large pool of demonstrators (61), highlighting the
importance of task difficulty. Another showed that blending in-
heritance, where learners combine information from multiple
demonstrators, also leads to a group size effect (60), providing an
alternative mechanism to the assumption that people solely copy
the most skilled group member (47).
Cultural Phylogenetics. The use of phylogenetic methods to re-
construct human history has been greatly extended in both
methodology and subject matter. Methodologically, maximum
parsimony has been superseded by Bayesian Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques that allow the testing of ex-
plicit evolutionary hypotheses such as whether artifacts exhibit
core packages of traits that are inherited together (64); network-
based methods to handle non–tree-like reticulation (30); and/or
phylogeographic methods that explicitly model the spread of
cultural traits in space, making assumptions about geographical
constraints [e.g., water bodies as potential barriers to language
diffusion (65)].
Such methods have been used to test hypotheses about human
history with more rigor than traditional nonquantitative, non-
evolutionary methods, shedding light on, for example, the origin
of the Indo-European language family (55), whether similarities
between hand-axe assemblages are caused by shared descent or
convergence (66), the historical links between folktales from
different regions (30), and even the recent evolution of computer
programming languages (67). These analyses do not ignore
existing work in traditional historical disciplines. They often test
existing hypotheses, but using larger samples and more powerful
statistical techniques. For example, Currie et al. (68) found
support in South-East Asia and the Pacific for the hypothesis
that political complexity increases in a unilinear sequence (69),
moving from acephalous to simple chiefdoms, to complex
chiefdoms, to states, without skipping stages, but with possible
collapses down to any earlier stage (note that this latter point is
evidence against the aforementioned Spencerian “progress”
theories of social evolution, which posited that progress toward
increasing complexity is an inevitable law). Similarly, Haynie and
Bowern (70) used phylogenetic comparative analyses of Australian
languages to test Berlin and Kay’s sequence model of color term
acquisition (71), where languages first acquire terms for black/
white, then red, then green/yellow, then blue, then brown. This
model was generally supported, albeit with many exceptions to
the sequence.
Empirical Tests of Social Learning Biases. Cultural evolution models
contain assumptions about how people learn from one another.
Some posit biases such as conformity, where people are dispro-
portionately more likely to copy common cultural traits, or
success or prestige biases, where people preferentially copy traits
of successful or prestigious individuals (11). Others explore the
consequences of learning from parents (vertical transmission),
elders (oblique transmission), and peers (horizontal trans-
mission) (10). Where possible, these assumptions are made using
evidence from the social and behavioral sciences, such as the
social learning literature in psychology (72) or the diffusion of
innovations literature in sociology (73). However, such evidence
was not collected with these models in mind, and is often un-
suitable. For example, classic psychology studies of conformity
confound social influence and personal judgment in a way that
cannot reveal whether conformity in the sense modeled in the
cultural evolution literature is present (74). Such differences may
seem trivial, but they have significant population-level implica-
tions: Only conformity in the sense of disproportionately copying
the majority can lead to within-group homogeneity (11). Con-
sequently, the past decade has seen the use of field studies and
laboratory experiments that test the assumptions and predictions
of cultural microevolution models.
Field studies, typically conducted in small-scale societies where
paths of social transmission are easier to trace, have examined
whether and when people use vertical, oblique, or horizontal
transmission to acquire key skills, beliefs, or knowledge. This
research shows a cumulative refinement of findings. An initial
study on the Aka, relying solely on retrospective self-report
(asking people from whom they learned X), found substantial
vertical transmission for most traits, including hunting skills, food
gathering/preparation techniques, infant care methods, and sharing
norms, with dancing and singing the only domains with substantial
nonparental influence (75).
However, retrospective self-report is vulnerable to recall bias.
Later studies used nonretrospective methods (e.g., asking to
whom people would go to learn X) or non–self-report regres-
sions to assess pairwise similarity across respondents, on the
assumption that higher similarity indicates transmission between
those individuals. These studies support a two-stage model of
skill acquisition (76–79): People initially learn from their parents,
and then update this knowledge by learning from older adults or
peers later in life. Moreover, the updating stage typically targets
highly skilled or knowledgeable individuals (76). Interestingly,
this pattern resembles evidence regarding childhood learning in
Western societies, where peers are more important than parents
for the acquisition of key skills and knowledge (80). Such findings
are also consistent with models of age-based learning schedules,
which find that cumulative cultural evolution is facilitated when
learning becomes increasingly oblique and horizontal with age
(81). Nevertheless, these generalizations betray many exceptions,
and effects may vary with domain (82).
Laboratory experiments have explored similar questions re-
garding from whom people learn. Experiments offer more con-
trol than field studies, albeit with reduced external validity.
Participants face an unfamiliar task designed to resemble a real-
life task faced by people past or present. They can solve this task
through asocial learning and/or various forms of social learning
(e.g., conformity, success bias). Such studies paint a consistent
pattern despite using different tasks and protocols (74, 83–87).
At least some people behave adaptively as predicted by models,
by learning socially when appropriate (e.g., when asocial learning
is costly) and in an appropriate manner (e.g., using success bias
rather than copying at random). Moreover, some people exhibit
adaptive flexibility, such as using payoff bias in a task to determine
which of two choices yields higher payoffs, but frequency-based
biases in a coordination task where it pays to match others’
choices (85).
However, across these experiments, there are unexplained
individual differences in social learning use and often an un-
derutilization of social information (74, 83–87). There is some
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evidence linking this individual variation to other individual
differences, such as personality (87) or intelligence (88, 89), but
these correlations are weak and exploratory. There is also evi-
dence of cross-cultural variation in social learning, specifically
higher social learning in collectivistic East Asian societies than in
individualistic Western societies (90, 91). Similar individual and
cultural variation in nonexperimental data suggests that this
finding is not just a laboratory artifact (92).
The causes and consequences of this individual and cultural
variation are unclear. Individual variation in social learning is
found in many species. It can be viewed on a continuum of
phenotypic plasticity, from genetically polymorphic and de-
velopmentally fixed individual differences, to developmentally
determined facultative responses to external environments or
physiological state, to the associative learning of learning strat-
egies (93). Whether individual variation in human social learning
is nonadaptive noise, reflects frequency-dependent equilibria
between information producers and scroungers with no group-
level benefit (32), or is adaptive at the group level by maintaining
a mix of innovation and tradition is unknown.
Cultural variation in human social learning suggests that we
acquire norms via social learning that, in turn, affect our degree
of social learning (93). This process may generate cultural dy-
namics entailing the “social learning of social learning” (94),
rather than the typical modeling assumption that learning
strategies are genetically inherited. The origin of this cultural
variation is unknown, but it might be an historical and societal
response to different rates of environmental change (95). An-
other line of work has identified intentional, institution-based
mechanisms for generating innovation (96), suggesting similar
flexibility in asocial learning. There is great scope to use the
methods of cultural macroevolution outlined above to test these
hypotheses and explain how cultural macroevolution, as well as
genetic evolution, has shaped the behavioral responses measured
in experiments, rather than assuming that participants are
coming into the laboratory as “blank slates.”
Development. The brief mentions above of work with children
belie rapid growth in the study of the developmental basis of
cultural evolution (97). Such studies are crucial for un-
derstanding how people developmentally acquire the learning
biases noted above to be individually and culturally variable, and
how these learning biases interact with developing abilities, such
as language and theory of mind. Experiments have shown that
children are sophisticated social learners and exhibit biases
predicted by models to be adaptive, such as preferentially
learning from accurate over inaccurate individuals (98) and
prestigious over nonprestigious individuals (99). There is work
combining biases, finding that children copy groups over indi-
viduals when both are equally successful but copy successful in-
dividuals over unsuccessful groups, thus adaptively switching
between frequency and success information (100). Other work
has addressed the motivation for copying, with children more
likely to imitate indiscriminately when tasks are presented as
conventional rather than instrumental, such that the motiva-
tion is to affiliate with one’s group rather than acquire effective
skills (101).
There are exceptions to these impressive skills, however. One
study found that children copy adults over peers even when peers
are more knowledgeable (102). In addition, there is similar in-
dividual (103) and cultural (90) variation as seen in adults, which
has yet to be explained. Further work is needed to link the study
of social learning in childhood and adulthood, ideally using
models to link developmentally changing learning schedules to
macroevolutionary patterns of cumulative culture (81).
Cultural Attraction. An ongoing debate has been over the relative
role of preservative, selection-like processes and nonselective,
transformative processes in explaining cultural change (104–
107). Many of the cultural evolution models described earlier
assume high-fidelity transmission plus random copying error or
mutation, with selection-like processes, such as content or con-
formist biases, altering the frequency of cultural traits over time.
Sperber and coworkers (105, 106) have argued that many in-
stances of cultural change do not take this form. Instead, they
argue, cultural transmission is transformative: People reconstruct
what they learn from others according to their preexisting
knowledge, cognitive or perceptual biases, or other factors. This
process of transformation is known as cultural attraction, and the
points at which representations converge are called cultural
attractors (105, 106) [although ambiguities in these definitions
are discussed elsewhere (108)].
For example, recall the phylogenetic analysis showing that
Australian languages typically acquire color terms in the specific
Berlin–Kay sequence, explaining cross-cultural regularities in
color terminology (70). Cultural attraction offers a plausible
microevolutionary explanation for this finding: People share
perceptual systems that lead them to invent and transform color
terms independently in the same way. This explanation is sup-
ported by experiments in which initially random artificial color
terms were passed along chains of people (109). Each participant
learned unfamiliar terms for each color, with these labels, in-
cluding errors, passed to the next person as his or her learning
set. In each of 30 independent chains, the artificial terminology
converged on the predicted Berlin–Kay scheme, as each person
transformed the labels in a systematic manner. Similar experi-
ments have shown convergence toward universal patterns of
grammatical structure (110), category learning (111) and
bloodletting as a medical practice (112).
The cultural attraction approach moves the explanatory focus
from the population to the individual level. Rather than explaining
patterns of cultural diversity, stability, and change in terms of the
differential selection of certain cultural variants (e.g., content
biases) or differential copying of certain individuals (e.g., success
bias, prestige bias), cultural attraction focuses on how individuals
systematically transform representations. The latter is similar
[but not identical (107)] to evolutionary psychologists’ notion of
“evoked culture” (113), where genetically evolved cognitive
biases cause the independent recurrence of genetically adap-
tive behavior, and the process of iterated learning, where re-
peated learning and transmission cause convergence on inductive
biases or priors (111).
Although cultural attraction is sometimes presented as an al-
ternative to cultural evolution, the two approaches are compat-
ible (104). Many “standard” cultural evolution models, in fact,
do not model transmission as high fidelity, and allow for trans-
formation (47, 114). The notion of guided variation (11) is
similar to the individual, nonrandom transformation described as
cultural attraction, and can operate in parallel to the more
selection-like transmission biases in Table 1. However, cultural
attraction proponents have a valid point that, in practice, such
transformative processes have not received adequate attention.
The relative influence of each likely varies with domain (104).
Where there are clear inductive biases favoring certain repre-
sentations, such as bloodletting or color terms, then explanations
in terms of transformation/attraction will be useful. Where there
are no clear intuitions or inductive biases, selection-like pro-
cesses will be more important. Bloodletting, for example, has
been replaced in many societies with surgical techniques that are
the product of a long refinement and accumulation of unintuitive
knowledge and skills. Many medical, scientific, and technological
practices are the product of accidental invention followed by
payoff-biased selection in the face of resistance due to confor-
mity to prior practices or transformation back to intuitive
attractors (115). Examples include glassmaking (116); musical
instruments (12]); and the theory of evolution, an unintuitive
idea that needs conscious effort to understand (118).
Even where there is clear evidence for inductive biases, as in
the case of color terms (109), the prediction of cross-cultural
universals is only partially upheld in real-world data, as shown
by the many exceptions to the Berlin–Kay scheme identified by
phylogenetic analyses (70). Further work might show these
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exceptions to be determined by processes like migration or
prestige bias. A Bayesian framework can be useful here, having
been used to model both attraction-like inductive biases (111) and
selection-like biases (119). This integration of selective and
transformative processes, and use of both microevolutionary evi-
dence regarding cognitive biases and macroevolutionary analyses
of actual cultural diversity and change, holds great promise.
Historical and Contemporary Social Dynamics. As well as cultural
phylogenetics, another approach to understanding historical
change uses population dynamic models of the kind used within
ecology to model changes in population size over time in re-
sponse to births, deaths, predation, or migration (120). This
approach is more useful when detailed temporal data are avail-
able, such as on the rise and fall of empires. Again, models and
theories are not unthinkingly imported from ecology and applied
to human societies. They are adapted to take into account the
unique aspects of human culture, often drawing on traditional
theories from history and sociology. However, the advantages of
this approach are that (i) theories can be precisely quantified in a
way that generates clear predictions, unlike verbal arguments,
and (ii) these predictions can be empirically tested often across
multiple societies, regions, and time periods, in a way that his-
torians seldom do (120).
For example, Turchin (120) used population dynamic models
to test competing theories for the rise and fall of empires in
Europe during the period from AD 0–1900. One idea, proposed
by Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century, can be interpreted as a
theory of multilevel selection. Here, societies grow by solving
collective action problems, such as building irrigation systems or
organizing collective defense against enemies. Societies that
more effectively solve such problems grow in size and defeat
other less internally cooperative societies, eventually becoming
empires. When societies are very large, however, there is over-
production of elites who fight among themselves for power, as
well as a disconnect between the majority and the squabbling
elites. This internal conflict allows another society to invade,
typically one in a border region with higher internal cooperation
due to its smaller size and common enemy (the larger empire).
This new empire grows larger, internal cooperation breaks down,
the new empire is itself eventually invaded, and the cycle
continues.
Turchin (120) converted this verbal theory into a quantitative
model, incorporating within-group cooperation as well as factors
traditionally considered important, such as access to resources
and geographical overreach (121). This model provided a better
fit to historical data on the rise and fall of actual empires than
models without cooperation. This work shows not only the value
of quantitative cultural evolution models and empirical tests as
applied to history but also support for the idea of multilevel
cultural selection, where societies grow as a result of superior
within-group cooperation that provides an advantage in between-
group competition (11, 122). Subsequent work has found further
support for this theory in a spatially explicit model tested with data
beyond Europe (123).
More recently, Turchin (124) has applied these ideas to current
societies, particularly the United States, extending structural-
demographic theories from political science (125). Worryingly,
elite overproduction, interelite conflict, and social inequality, which
were key markers of low within-group cooperation and impending
empire collapse in the past, have been increasing in the United
States in recent decades. Examples of interelite conflict include
decreased Republican-Democrat cooperation in government and
the Tea Party challenge within the Republican Party. The success
of self-styled antiestablishment figures, such as Donald Trump,
is arguably due to rising social inequality and a disconnect
between the majority of voters and the increasingly conflict-
ridden political elites.
Predicting the future can never be done with complete certainty,
for either genetic or cultural evolution. However, the work of
Turchin (124) and others makes events like the unexpected election
of Donald Trumpmore understandable, and provides early warning
signs of societal collapse based on the long view of cultural evolu-
tion that we ignore at our peril. Continual progress toward more
stable forms of political organization is far from inevitable (68), and
institutions are fragile balancing acts between individual and group
interests (122). Better understanding of this balance, within the long
view of cultural evolution, is surely crucial for creating and main-
taining sustainable societies.
Conclusions
Science itself is a cumulative cultural evolutionary process (126).
Is the science of cultural evolution accumulating an increasingly
reliable body of knowledge concerning human culture? I hope I
have shown that it is. Initial claims derived from self-reports that
cultural transmission is largely vertical have been replaced with a
two-stage model in which parental knowledge is updated via
horizontal or oblique transmission, often targeted in age- or skill-
appropriate ways (76, 77). The common modeling assumption
that social learning is under fixed genetic control is incompatible
with experimental evidence of substantial individual and cultural
variation, and is being revised (93). The “demographic turn”
within archaeology, itself an improvement on unrealistic “single
genetic mutation” explanations for increases in past cultural
complexity, has been refined to focus on population density and
migration rather than just population size (49). Long-standing
hypotheses regarding the acquisition of color terms, origin of
Indo-European languages, and trajectory of sociopolitical com-
plexity have been tested using phylogenetic methods that are
more powerful than informal comparisons using cherry-picked
examples (26).
However, major questions remain, which is also the normal
course of science. Ongoing work seeks to explain why only hu-
mans exhibit cumulative cultural evolution, the origins of indi-
vidual and cultural variation in social learning and innovation,
the relative influence of selection and attraction across domains,
and the balance between individual and group interests that
shape societal cohesion and stability. A welcome trend is to apply
cultural evolution theory to real-world problems, including en-
vironmental sustainability (122), the social effects of new digital
media (51) and society-level cooperation (124). The work reviewed
here is, moreover, a small selection of cultural evolution research.
There is no space to cover, say, economics (127), neuroscience
(128), literature (129), or religion (130).
As well as the use of quantitative methods, often borrowed
from biology (Table 2), a major strength of cultural evolution
work is its interdisciplinarity. Findings from, say, experimental
psychology can be applied to problems in archaeology (16). Con-
versely, a consideration of the population-level consequences of
psychological constructs, such as conformity, highlights their lim-
itations (74). This interdisciplinarity should be pushed further,
especially by integrating microevolution and macroevolution. For
example, phylogenetic analyses of actual color terminologies (70)
reveal broad support but key exceptions to the universality pre-
dicted by experiments (109). Are these exceptions also predictable
from individual cognition, or are other factors needed? More
broadly, interdisciplinarity is facilitated by open science. Although
data and analytical techniques have traditionally been kept within
disciplines as protected knowledge, the public release of data and
use of reproducible analyses (e.g., R scripts) encourage scholars
from other disciplines to explore that data and familiarize them-
selves first-hand with key findings.
However, there is still an epistemological gulf between the
scientific, evolutionary approach outlined here and much of the
social sciences and humanities, which, after all, study the same
cultural phenomena (131, 132). Most cultural anthropologists,
sociologists, historians, and the like are reluctant to use the sim-
plifying assumptions and reductionism inherent in quantitative
models and methods, instead highlighting complexity and contradic-
tions. There is also a reluctance to generalize across societies, re-
gions, or time periods and, instead, a focus on specificity and
uniqueness. There is also a reluctance to consider continuities
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between human behavior and the behavior of other species, with
the latter often perceived to be “instinctive” or genetically de-
termined in a way that human behavior is not [an overview of
these issues from both sides is provided elsewhere (131)].
This reluctance is, I think, misguided. The methods and ap-
proaches described here add to, rather than detract from, tra-
ditional methods and knowledge. Phylogenetic analyses typically
use existing linguistic or ethnographic data to reconstruct his-
torical relationships and test causal historical hypotheses, but
with greater rigor than is possible by considering single case
studies or ignoring Galton’s problem (20). Quantitative models
are simply verbal arguments expressed more precisely and un-
ambiguously, and in a way that affords easier empirical testing.
Those verbal arguments often come from the social sciences and
humanities (120, 121, 124, 125). There are also excellent exam-
ples of traditional ethnography providing important corrections
to cultural evolution theory, such as Wilf’s (96) demonstration
that cultural innovation can be institutionally driven. Further-
more, cultural evolution offers a link to the wider evolutionary
sciences without inappropriate genetic determinism. Unlike so-
ciobiology and evolutionary psychology approaches that downplay
transmitted culture (113), the work outlined here assumes that
cultural evolution is semiautonomous from genetic evolution,
allowing rapid cultural adaptation to novel physical and social
environments without genetic change. Although some aspects of
cultural diversity may reflect genetically evolved, content-rich
cognitive biases, many others reflect the accumulation of modifi-
cations via content-independent learning rules such as success
bias, leading to diverse, historically contingent pathways of
culturally inherited knowledge. The theory of cultural evolution
offers a means of taking culture seriously within a scientific,
evolutionary framework.
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